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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS  
IN MALAYSIA 
Drew R. Atkins† 
Abstract:  The International Committee of the Red Cross published a study in 
2005 identifying rules of customary international law applicable to armed conflict and 
theoretically binding on all nations.  This study found that customary state practice has 
come to encompass and in some cases exceed protections contained in the Additional 
Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, regardless of their applicability to 
a given conflict.  These findings may impact the domestic law enforcement practices of 
states not parties to Additional Protocol II, which regulates non-international armed 
conflict.  Furthermore, the study may have indirect effects on military cooperation and 
legal reform worldwide.  By strengthening the legal criticism of domestic laws not 
compliant with international humanitarian law, the study directly challenges non-party 
states seeking to obtain unqualified military assistance during internal conflicts.  
However, this same effect will lend support to increased observance of international 
humanitarian law as intervening states’ militaries apply pressure to realize compliance 
with customary international law.  This comment identifies these implications by 
considering a hypothetical future counter-insurgency in Malaysia in which the United 
States offers military assistance to the Malaysian government.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2003 arrest of the Malaysian terrorist Hambali reflects the 
increasing worldwide reliance on multinational military and police 
operations to combat emerging internal security threats.1  This operation, 
targeting one of the masterminds of the Jemaah Islamiyah bombings in Bali 
and Jakarta,2 involved law enforcement and intelligence personnel from 
several countries rather than a unilateral operation against an isolated 
enemy.3  The combination of a continuing threat from transnational 
extremist groups in Southeast Asia4 and the increasingly multinational 
military response to this threat makes sources of international law governing 
                                         
†
 The author thanks Professor Clark Lombardi, University of Washington School of Law; Major 
Sean Watts, United States Army; and the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal Editorial Board. 
1
 See Tony Emmanuel & Leslie Andres, Hambali for Camp Delta, New Straits Times (Malaysia), 
August 17, 2003, at 1; Bilveer Singh, ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah 
Threat 41 (2003). 
2
 See SINGH, supra note 1, at 41. 
3
 See Emmanuel, supra note 1. 
4
 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET, MALAYSIA 
(December 30, 2005), available at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_960.html (explaining that 
the State Department continues to consider both the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist 
organizations as active threats for Americans traveling overland in Malaysia). 
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the use of force more relevant as a regulatory scheme for the region’s 
response.   
It is against this backdrop that the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (“ICRC”) culminated a ten-year effort to identify rules of customary 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”) applicable to armed conflict.5  In 
addition to customary rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities between 
states, the ICRC study also identifies customary rules of international law 
regulating armed conflicts in which a state combats insurgents within its 
borders.6  Since IHL governing these internal armed conflicts requires states 
to meet minimum standards for the treatment and judicial procedural rights 
of detainees,7 changes in the IHL regime can have great implications for the 
legality of domestic laws with respect to international law.   
Prior to addressing the import of the ICRC study, it is necessary to 
understand general principles of IHL and customary law.  International 
humanitarian law is the body of customary and formal law that regulates the 
conduct of hostilities between belligerents8 in order “to mitigate some of the 
more horrific aspects of organized violence.”9  Also known as the law of 
armed conflict and the law of war,10 IHL governs the use of force during 
hostilities11 and establishes protections for civilians.12  It is a distinct body of 
law from human rights law, although many of the general principles 
                                         
5
 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
[hereinafter ICRC], CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005).  See also Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding 
and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, March 2005, at 175, 
177 (summarizing the study’s findings).   
6
 See Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 197.    
7
 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4-6, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [Commonly known as Additional Protocol II; hereinafter APII]. 
8
 It is important to note that while IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities, it is a distinct body of 
law from human rights law.  Human rights law does not regulate the conduct of belligerents vis-à-vis each 
other, but instead is “intended to protect individuals from the arbitrary or cruel treatment of their 
government at all times.”  Therefore, while the existence of a conflict triggers the application of IHL, 
human rights law requires no such trigger.  UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY 
OPERATIONS, 2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 30 (2005) [hereinafter LOW HANDBOOK].   
9
 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, 
ACTORS, AND PROCESSES 501 (2005). 
10
 LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 2. 
11
 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 501 (The law of war refers to “the law governing the conduct of 
war once initiated”, or jus in bello, apart from the law governing “when a state may legitimately use armed 
force in international affairs”, or jus in bello... International humanitarian law now applies to states, 
insurgent groups, and individuals engaged in armed conflict.”). 
12
 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 502. 
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informing human rights law are also central to IHL.13  The Geneva 
Conventions of 194914 are one of the major codifications of IHL.  Together 
with their 1977 Additional Protocols, they provide a comprehensive body of 
law for regulating both international and internal armed conflict.15   
Even where the Geneva Conventions do not apply to a conflict, 
customary international law nevertheless regulates the conduct of 
hostilities.16  Unlike a convention, customary law informally evolves from 
the consistent practices of most states and reflects their perception of their 
legal obligations.17  While a convention binds a state through the state’s act 
of ratification, customary international law binds all states who have not 
persistently objected to a rule both during and subsequent to its formation.18  
Due to the default applicability of customary law to armed conflict, the 
evolution of rules of customary IHL can have broad implications for all 
states, regardless of the type or intensity of conflict involved.19   
The ICRC has defined customary IHL in a way that may become 
problematic for non-party states seeking international military cooperation in 
combating internal resistance movements.  By arguing that a rule is 
customary international law, the ICRC both intrudes on the sovereign sphere 
of signatories to international humanitarian law treaties such as the Geneva 
Conventions and challenges non-signatories to bring their domestic laws into 
compliance with international standards.  This conflict with customary 
                                         
13
 Much of IHL is analogous to fundamental principles of human rights law, such as the respect for 
the life and dignity of all people.  See Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International 
Law and Detentions Abroad in the “War on Terror”, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, March 2005, 39, 54. 
14
 Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention [II] for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
the Geneva Conventions]. 
15
 Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 178. 
16
 LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 20; Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 177. 
17
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
(1987); DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 32.  The ICRC study defines customary international law “a 
general practice accepted as law,” where evidence indicates both State practice and a State “belief that such 
practice is required, prohibited, or allowed... as a matter of law.”  HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra 
note 5, at xxxi-xxxii, citing International Court of Justice Statute, Article 38(1)(b).    
18
 LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 20.  See also DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 74 
(“…international law permits states to opt out of an emerging customary international law rule by objecting 
to the rule as it develops . . . .  Moreover, a rule once formed is binding on states that did not object, even if 
they did not have the opportunity to object.”). 
19
 See infra Part II, Section B.  See also Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 189 (“Indeed [state] practice has 
created a substantial numbers of customary rules that are more detailed than the often rudimentary 
provisions in Additional Protocol II and has thus filled important gaps in the regulation of internal 
conflicts.”). 
82 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
international law may simultaneously impair a state’s ability to obtain 
military assistance for internal conflicts, and may strengthen the IHL regime 
as intervening states apply pressure for legal reform as a condition of 
providing assistance.20 
The ICRC’s findings are of great importance to international law 
because of the unique role of the ICRC as a respected and preeminent 
authority on IHL.  The ICRC is a critical player in the maintenance of the 
IHL regime, having a broad international mandate to develop, interpret, and 
enforce IHL through the Geneva Conventions.21  The study’s findings thus 
warrant careful international consideration during any armed conflict. 
To demonstrate the effects of the study, this comment will identify the 
inconsistencies between the ICRC’s identified customary rules and 
Malaysia’s widely criticized Internal Security Act (“ISA”)22 prosecutions in 
the case of a future internal armed conflict in Malaysia.23  Malaysia provides 
a useful example of the study’s effects because it has been a hotbed of 
violent extremism in recent years24 and because it has used controversial 
means such as the ISA to address insurgent violence.25  This comment will 
consider Malaysia’s practices in light of the involvement of the United States 
in a future conflict, given the United States’ aggressive posture toward 
combating terrorism and the U.S. military’s stated adherence to rules of 
customary IHL.26  Due to the conflicts between the study’s customary law 
                                         
20
 See infra Part IV, Part A.2. 
21
 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The ICRC’s Status: In a Class By Its Own, February 17, 2004, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/522C6628D83A019741256E3D003FC85F.  See also 
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 510; INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 154 (2000) (explaining that the 
international community considers the ICRC to be “a highly important organization” due to its role in 
wartime situations, its “strict observance of confidentiality” in providing battlefield care, and its 
contribution to the development of humanitarian law). 
22
 Internal Security Act, Act 82 (1960) (Malay.) [hereinafter ISA]. 
23
 Since 2001, Malaysia has used the ISA to detain and prosecute persons allegedly involved in 
“militant Islamic activities” of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization and the Kumpulan Militan 
Malaysia insurgent organization.  Malaysia has received widespread criticism for its law enforcement 
practices under the ISA in combating these groups, including the abuse of detainees and the lack of 
meaningful criminal procedure guarantees.  See Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia’s 
Internal Security Act, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1345, 1346-48 (2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED 
WITHOUT TRIAL: ABUSE OF INTERNAL SECURITY DETAINEES IN MALAYSIA 7, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/malaysia0905/3.htm. 
24
 See United States Department of State, Consular Information Sheet, Malaysia, supra note 4.   
25
 See Fritz & Flaherty, supra note 23, at 1347. 
26
 See BRIAN J. BILL, ED., LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 32 (2000) (explaining that the U.S. 
considers most of APII to be customary international law).  Additionally, the U.S. military considers 
customary international law binding on U.S. forces operating worldwide.  DoD Directive 5100.77, DoD 
Law of War Program, December 9, 1998, available at www.hqda.army.mil/ogc/ 
EXEC%20AGENTS%20REF%20LIBRARY/19%20d510077p.pdf, § 3.1.  See infra Part IV.2 (regarding 
the questionable legality of U.S. conduct in “the War on Terror”). 
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findings and Malaysian practices, the study could hinder the United States’ 
ability to fully support Malaysian counterinsurgency operations.  
Although the study’s findings are controversial,27 this comment does 
not address its methodology or conclusions, rather accepting the findings in 
light of the ICRC’s well-respected international status.  Part II of this 
comment will discuss the regulation of internal armed conflict.  Part III will 
identify the conflicts between Malaysia’s counterinsurgency practices and its 
customary IHL obligations in the context of a future internal armed conflict.  
Part IV will discuss the ramifications of this inconsistency in the context of 
coalition military operations in Malaysia and conclude by identifying the 
broader international ramifications of the study. 
II. THE RED CROSS STUDY IMPACTS THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 
Unlike the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which regulate conflict 
between states, IHL governing internal armed conflicts regulates a sovereign 
state’s internal efforts to suppress insurgencies.28  Changes in the system of 
rules of customary international law governing internal strife thus invade the 
state’s internal sphere because customary law can apply regardless of the 
applicability of Geneva Convention provisions.29  This Part will identify the 
source of this interplay and discuss the ICRC customary law study’s general 
effect on state domestic law. 
A. States Have Opposed the Regulation of Internal Armed Conflicts as an 
Invasion of Sovereign Authority 
International humanitarian law regulating internal armed conflict, 
such as the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
(“APII”),30 recognizes the sovereign authority of a state to put down 
insurrection as an internal matter.31  Instead of prohibiting the prosecution of 
                                         
27
 See W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment, Presentation 
offered at 99th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., April 1, 
2005 (criticizing the basis for the ICRC study’s findings of customary prohibitions of incendiary weapons, 
exploding bullets and blinding laser weapons). 
28
 Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Geneva Conventions, Protocol II: The Confrontation of Sovereignty and 
International Law, The Amer. Soc. Of Int’l L. Newsletter, Nov. 1995. 
29
 See infra Part II, Section B. 
30
 APII, supra note 7. 
31
 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 
1977 1332 [hereinafter APII Commentary] (Combatant status for insurgents “would be incompatible, first, 
with respect for the principle of sovereignty of States, and secondly, with national legislation which makes 
rebellion a crime.”). 
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insurgents, this body of law establishes minimum protections for insurgents 
facing criminal prosecution.32  As a result, states have long opposed this 
interference with affairs they perceive to be wholly of domestic concern. 
Prior to the enactment of the Additional Protocols in 1977, Common 
Article Three was the sole provision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
addressing non-international, or internal armed conflict.33  In essence, it 
provided a “mini-convention” applicable to internal armed conflict and 
established minimum protections and prohibitions.34  Many countries have 
continuously resisted the application of Common Article Three to internal 
conflicts, arguing that extending IHL to internal conflicts lends unjustified 
legitimacy to insurgent groups and interferes with sovereign authority.35  
Especially in the face of such criticism, the ICRC recognized that Common 
Article Three inadequately regulated internal armed conflict.  This is largely 
due to the Article’s ambiguity, incomplete protections, and general lack of 
strong use and enforcement.36   
The prevalence of internal conflicts in place of international ones 
since 1945 made more apparent the need for an adequate body of law 
governing such conflicts.  In 1974 the ICRC convened a diplomatic 
convention to develop additional, more detailed rules for internal and 
international armed conflict.37  The resultant APII, however, did not receive 
as widespread support as the Geneva Conventions of 1949.38  Like Common 
Article Three, many developing states opposed the Additional Protocols 
                                         
32
 Id. at 1325.  See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Relevance of IHL in the Context of 
Terrorism, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/ 
8C4F3170C0C25CDDC1257045002CD4A2 (“In non-international armed conflict combatant status does 
not exist.  Prisoner of war or civilian protected status under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, 
respectively, do not apply.  Members of organized armed groups are entitled to no special status under the 
laws of non-international armed conflict and may be prosecuted under domestic criminal law if they have 
taken part in hostilities.”). 
33
 Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 14. 
34
 See id. 
35
 LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002).  See also Aslan Abashidze, 
The Relevance from the Perspective of Actors in Non-International Armed Conflicts, Address Before the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council-Partnership for Peace Workshop on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (March 9-10, 2006), available at http://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/events/ 
index.cfm?action=detail&eventID=258 (“The inclusion of the Art 3 in all the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 was the decisive move towards the legal intrusion of international humanitarian law into the 
traditional sphere of internal affairs of sovereign states. . .”).   
36
 Schneider, supra note 28. 
37
 See MOIR, supra note 35, at 89. 
38
 One hundred and ninety-two countries are parties to the Conventions of 1949, but only 162 and 
159 states are parties to Additional Protocols I and II, respectively.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
STATES PARTY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, (Apr. 12, 2005), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList492/ 
77EA1BDEE20B4CCDC1256B6600595596. 
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because of a view that they “granted too much legal legitimacy to non-state 
belligerents and to the use of guerilla warfare.”39   
Additional Protocol II and rules of customary law derived from it such 
as those of the ICRC study regulate internal armed conflict in much greater 
detail than does Common Article Three.  For example, Common Article 
Three prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment.”40  In contrast, APII contains a full article titled 
“humane treatment” which sets out specific prohibitions, such as “(e) 
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
... (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”41  Similarly, each of 
APII’s 28 articles establishes specific and detailed guarantees and 
prohibitions to which a state must adhere when fighting an internal armed 
conflict within the Protocol’s scope.  As a result, the evolution of customary 
law derived from APII can have great effect on non-party states.  As will be 
shown below, these customary rules may apply whether or not an insurgent 
group meets the threshold conditions to trigger the protections of APII. 
B. The Red Cross Study Sought to Identify the Effects of Customary Law 
on the International Regulation of Armed Conflict 
The interplay of domestic law and APII illuminate the invasive 
ramifications of the ICRC study.  The ICRC, because of its international 
mandate to promulgate IHL, clarifies and increases the legal obligations of 
states through interpretive tools such as the 2005 customary law study.  By 
arguing that a rule derived from conventions such as APII is customary law, 
the ICRC challenges non-party states such as Malaysia to bring their 
domestic laws into compliance in the face of alleged international consensus. 
Several problems with APII led the ICRC to complete a study 
identifying rules of customary international law that are binding on non-
party states and universally applicable regardless of whether APII would 
apply to the conflict.42  The Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols may or may not apply to a given conflict based on the type and 
magnitude of the conflict, and based on whether the combatant parties are 
                                         
39
 Nathan A. Canestaro, “Small Wars” and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents in Iraq, 
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 90-91 (2004).  See also DETTER, supra note 21, at 202-04. 
40
 Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 14. 
41
 APII, supra note 7, art. 4.   
42
 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at xxvii.  See also MOIR, supra note 35, at 109 
(writing in 2002 that, “It is doubtful whether much of APII represents even customary international law, let 
alone jus cogens. . .”).   
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signatories to the conventions.43  The ICRC study thus had two central 
purposes.  First, the study identified rules of customary international law 
applicable to armed conflict, regardless of whether a particular state has 
ratified a treaty or convention governing armed conflict.44  Second, the study 
determined whether and to what extent customary law has come to exceed 
the protections of APII and other sources of IHL.45 
The study found that state practice worldwide has “expanded the rules 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts” beyond the limits of APII, 
and that state practice has caused several provisions of APII to become 
customary international law.46  Examples of such expanded rules include the 
principle of distinction, the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, a 
proportionality provision, and obligations to protect and respect the 
fundamental rights of civilians and enemies who have laid down their 
arms.47   
The expansion and elaboration of the IHL regime through customary 
international law impacts states not parties to treaties and conventions such 
as the Geneva Conventions.  Arguing that a rule is customary international 
law carries with it the implied assertion that the applicability of treaty law 
such as APII to the given conflict is irrelevant.  This effect is readily 
                                         
43
 For example, the Geneva Conventions apply only “to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more High Contracting Parties.”  Geneva Conventions, 
supra note 14, common art. 2.  Similarly, APII has several restrictive limiting conditions that prevent it 
from applying to mere uprisings and requires “the most intense and large scale [internal] conflicts.”  MOIR, 
supra note 35, at 101, discussing APII, supra note 7, art. 1.  See also Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 177-78 
(“The first purpose of the study was therefore to determine which rules of international humanitarian law 
are part of customary international law and therefore applicable to all parties of a conflict, regardless of 
whether or not they have ratified the treaties containing the same or similar rules.”). 
44
 Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 177. 
45
 Id. at 178. 
46
 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at xxix; Id. at 189. 
47
 Id. at 187-88.  The following are several of the relevant customary law rules the study identifies:  
“(1) Fundamental Guarantees: Rule 87. Civilians and persons hors de combat must be treated humanely.  
Rule 90. Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment, are prohibited . . . Rule 99. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited.  Rule 
100. No one may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial 
guarantees . . .  Rule 102. No one may be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual criminal 
responsibility.  Rule 103. Collective punishments are prohibited . . . (2) Persons Deprived of Their Liberty:  
Rule 118. Persons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate food, water, clothing, shelter 
and medical attention . . . Rule 125. Persons deprived of their liberty must be allowed to correspond with 
their families, subject to reasonable conditions relating to frequency and the need for censorship by the 
authorities.  Rule 126. Civilian internees and persons deprived of their liberty in connection with a non-
international armed conflict must be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, to the degree 
practicable.  Rule 127. The personal convictions and religious practices of persons deprived of their liberty 
must be respected . . . Rule 128(C). Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-international 
armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist.  
The persons referred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal proceedings are pending 
against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed.”  Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 206-09. 
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explored through considering one state’s law enforcement practices in light 
of the study’s findings.   
The magnitude of an insurgency required to trigger the application of 
the customary rules is unclear from the study.  APII contains very strict 
threshold criteria an insurgent force must meet in order to obtain its 
protections;48 for example, an unorganized mob would not invoke APII.  The 
ICRC study has found that the rules of customary law have exceeded APII’s 
regulation of IAC,49 but the study is silent on whether those rules still 
require – as customary law – the meeting of APII’s threshold conditions.   
Since the study does not explicitly incorporate these trigger 
conditions, this comment assumes that these rules would protect any 
insurgent qualifying for the protections of Common Article Three.  The text 
of Common Article Three is silent on its triggering conditions, but its 
commentary provides a list of suggested criteria derived from the 
amendments discussed during the 1949 drafting convention.50  Generalized 
criteria that could qualify an organized insurgency in Malaysia in the future 
require that, to invoke the protections of the Article: 
“the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses 
an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, 
acting within a determinate territory and having the means of 
respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.”51 
Such an assumption is reasonable when considering how the rules could 
affect coalition operations in non-party states such as Malaysia.  First, 
Malaysia has experienced powerful insurgencies as recently as the several 
years since 2001.52  Second, should a coalition partner consider the 
insurgents protected due to that country’s interpretation of ICRC study, the 
ICRC’s omission would be irrelevant.  Consequently, this comment will 
assume for the purposes of its analysis that a future insurgent group would 
meet any conditions required to invoke the ICRC study’s customary rules. 
                                         
48
 Article I of APII requires the “dissident armed forces or other organized groups” to be “under 
responsible command” and to “exercise such control over a part of [the state’s] territory as to enable [the 
insurgents] to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.”  APII, supra note 7, art. 1.   
49
 Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 189. 
50
 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 49-50, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-570006?OpenDocument. 
51
 See id. at 49. 
52
 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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III. MALAYSIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY ACT LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 
VIOLATE THE STUDY’S RULES OF CUSTOMARY  INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Malaysia’s much-utilized Internal Security Act is a likely legal tool 
with which Malaysia would detain and prosecute future insurgents and 
terrorists.53  However, the language and application of the ISA are 
inconsistent with the ICRC study’s rules of customary international law.  
Other commentators have addressed the illegality of the ISA from the 
perspective of human rights law.54  Given the numerous similarities between 
human rights law and IHL,55 many of the same concerns arise when 
evaluating the ISA against IHL obligations. 
A. Malaysia Continues to Use the Internal Security Act to Target Internal 
Opposition 
Malaysia enacted the ISA in 1960 as an emergency power, but it has 
become an everyday law enforcement measure.  Use of the ISA has steadily 
increased since 2001 to target alleged militant Islamic groups,56 and both the 
language of the ISA and Malaysia’s practices in enforcing it are sources of 
controversy.  First, the language of the ISA diminishes a person’s freedom 
from arbitrary detention, revokes his or her criminal procedural protections, 
and destroys the presumption of innocence and the right to a trial.57  
Additionally, in practice, the Royal Malaysian Police has physically and 
psychologically abused ISA detainees and maintained poor conditions of 
detention.58 
In 1960, following twelve years of British struggle against communist 
insurgents during the “Malayan Emergency,” the newly independent 
                                         
53
 See Fritz, supra note 23, at 1346. 
54
 See id. at 1346-47. 
55
 See Borelli, supra note 13, at 66, citing Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay, 12 May 2002, ILM, Vol. 41 (2002), 532 (“It is well-
recognized that international human rights law applies at all times, in peacetime and in situations of armed 
conflict.  [I]n situations of armed conflict, the protections under international human rights and 
humanitarian law may complement and reinforce one another . . . sharing as they do a common nucleus of 
non-derogable rights and a common purpose of promoting human life and dignity.”). 
56
 Fritz, supra note 23, at 1347. 
57
 See id. at 1349-50.  This comment’s analysis of the ISA will not compare the ISA to ordinary 
criminal procedure rights in Malaysia.  Instead, this comment considers the ISA solely in light of 
customary international humanitarian law.  Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that the ISA abrogates 
many otherwise available rights of an accused criminal, including the right to be informed of the grounds 
for one’s arrest, the right to consult an attorney, and the presumption of innocence.  See 
Lawyerment.com.my, Criminal Law – Arrest, http://www.lawyerment.com.my/library/doc/crmn/arrest/ 
(providing general information on criminal procedure in Malaysia) (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). 
58
 Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, AI Index ASA 28/001/2005, 
April 7, 2005, available at http://origin2.amnesty.org/library/eng-mys/index. 
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Malaysian government incorporated many British emergency powers into 
the ISA as a temporary tool to combat communist insurgents.59  Over time, 
however, the ISA has become a government tool to “delegitimize 
generations of political opposition and silence those considered ‘deviant’ or 
‘subversive.’”60  
The ISA has also become a law enforcement tool in the struggle 
against trans-national Islamic extremists.  Since 2001, the Malaysian 
government has increasingly used the ISA to arrest and detain individuals for 
alleged involvement in militant Islamic activities.61  Given this shift in the 
targets of the ISA, Malaysia would likely continue to use it as a law 
enforcement tool against future militant Islamic insurgents. 
Human rights groups have long opposed the ISA,62 finding the lack of 
police accountability, objectionable police methods, and politically-
motivated detentions associated with its enforcement to violate widely-
accepted international human rights norms.63  While previous criticism has 
considered the ISA in light of human rights obligations, many of the same 
concerns arise in a humanitarian law context.  Because many of the same 
fundamental rights inform IHL and human rights law,64 many violations of 
human rights law also violate IHL rules. 
These customary law violations, combined with the problematic 
conditions of detention discussed above, demonstrate the central underlying 
problem with the ISA:  its inherent vagueness as a discretionary, 
“emergency” measure.65  The ICRC has identified “emergency powers” as a 
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 Fritz, supra note 23, at 1376.  
60
 Id. at 1346, 1376.  Malaysian courts have rejected arguments that the ISA narrowly applies only to 
communist insurgencies; in a 2002 case, the Malaysian Federal Court held that “the purpose of the ISA is 
for all forms of subversion...”  Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, 
2002-4 M.L.J. 449 (Malay.). 
61
 Fritz, supra note 23, at 1346; see also Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based 
Policing, supra note 58 (“Since 2001 hundreds of alleged Islamist ‘extremists’ have been arrested, accused 
of links to domestic or regional ‘terrorist’ networks.  Over 80 of those arrested have been issued two year 
detention orders and these orders are routinely extended without explanation”). 
62
 Fritz, supra note 23, at 1346. 
63
 The Fritz study, utilizing interviews and research, found five areas of concern regarding the ISA’s 
modern use:  “(1) the emergency framework of preventive detention laws; (2) reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause triggering arrest and detention; (3) legal defense and access to counsel; (4) forms of review; 
and (5) conditions of detention.”  Id. at 1349. 
64
 See Borelli, supra note 13, at 66. 
65
 Since the ISA’s roots and purpose lie in emergency situations, political pressure since 1960 has 
favored strengthening the ISA, not moderating it to bring it in line with international concerns.  Amnesty 
International notes that “successive states of emergency [have] led to the imposition of incrementally 
tighter restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties. . . . ”  Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human 
Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58. 
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source of many of the world’s IHL abuses, and Malaysia’s ISA provides 
further examples of the possible IHL violations such powers can cause.66 
B. The Application of the Internal Security Act Is Inconsistent with 
Customary International Humanitarian Law 
The language of the ISA and Malaysia’s enforcement practices are 
inconsistent with Malaysia’s customary law obligations as identified by the 
ICRC study.  Specific violations of Malaysia’s customary law obligations 
include arbitrary and lengthy detention without trial, charge, or hearing; the 
abuse of detainees and poor conditions of detention; and the denial of 
minimal criminal procedural guarantees.67  The ICRC customary law 
findings prohibit some textual provisions of the ISA and many of Malaysia’s 
ISA enforcement procedures and practices. 
1. Malaysia’s Treatment of Internal Security Act Detainees Violates Its 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Obligations 
Malaysian treatment of ISA detainees indicates violations of 
customary law that correlate to protections contained in Article 4 of APII.68  
Although the ICRC study vaguely defines its rules, several aspects of the 
conditions of ISA detentions violate the study’s customary law obligations.   
a. Internal Security Act detainees receive inhumane treatment 
Rule 87 of the study requires the humane treatment of civilians and 
insurgent combatants who have laid down their arms.69  This rule is almost 
identical to Article 4 of APII, which states that detainees “shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely.”70  The study does not precisely define 
                                         
66
 Editorial, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, March 2005, at 5, 5-7 (“For the ‘survival of the State’ or 
the ‘imperatives of security,’ almost any measure is authorized to back up the goal of protecting society:  
the call for strong and decisive action sets the social context for torture.  What begins as a programme 
centred on a limited number of suspects usually expands over time to encompass an ill-defined group or 
category of people.”).   
67
 See Fritz, supra note 23, at 1349-50.  Additionally, the Fritz study found that 1) detention 
conditions did not meet HRL obligations, 2) detainees were subject to physical and psychological abuse 
during interrogation, and 3) detainees were denied contact with their families during the initial sixty-day 
detention.  The study concluded that “the dire conditions of detention, the psychological abuse inflicted 
during interrogation, and the denial of access to detainees’ families remain standard procedure, and ensure 
that the experience of detention under the ISA is almost intolerable.”  Id. at 1417. 
68
 APII, supra note 7, art. 4. 
69
 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 306. 
70
 APII, supra note 7, art. 4. 
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“humane treatment,”71 instead relying on “the detailed rules found in 
international humanitarian law and human rights law [that] give expression 
to the meaning of ‘humane treatment.’”72  The study notes the prevalence in 
many international legal instruments of guarantees for a person’s “dignity” 
and prohibitions on “ill treatment.”73  Similarly, the APII Commentary states 
that humane treatment “should be understood in its broadest sense as 
applying to all the conditions of man’s existence.”74   
Similarly, Rule 118 states that “persons deprived of their liberty must 
be provided with adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical 
attention.”75  This provision does not mirror specific language of Article 4 of 
APII, but instead further elaborates on the term “humane treatment.”  The 
study interprets this rule to require that a state provide detainees with basic 
needs of subsistence that meet the conditions for subsistence of the local 
population, such that not providing adequate basic provisions “amounts to 
inhuman treatment.”76 
Several aspects of the conditions of the ISA detainees’ imprisonment 
violate these customary law requirements.  These conditions include lengthy 
solitary confinement in brightly-lit cells; filthy cells lacking beds; and the 
denial of reading material, adequate nutrition, and clothing.77  Additionally, 
as will be discussed below, studies have identified instances of physical and 
psychological abuse of detainees that may amount to torture. 
                                         
71
 “The term ‘treat humanely’ is based on the [1907] Hague Regulations [Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land]. . . .  The word ‘treatment’ should be understood in its broadest sense as applying 
to all the conditions of man’s existence.”  APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1370. 
72
 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 307-08 (The study looks at numerous sources to 
inform this Rule, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.). 
73
 Id. at 307. 
74
 See APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1370.    
75
 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 428. 
76
 Id. at 430, citing APII, art. 5(1)(b).  The general requirement of humane treatment may also 
demand compliance with Rule 127 as well as Rules 87 and 118.  Rule 127 states that “[t]he personal 
convictions and religious practices of persons deprived of their liberty must be respected.”  This provision 
requires a state to permit detainees to practice their religion subject to the disciplinary requirements of 
detention.  See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 449.  This requirement is analogous to 
Article 4, paragraph 1 of APII, which states that detainees “are entitled to respect for their person, honour, 
and convictions and religious practices.”  As the Commentary to Article 4 states, this requirement “is an 
element of humane treatment.”  APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1370.    
77
 See Fritz, supra note 23, at 1421; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL: ABUSE OF 
INTERNAL SECURITY DETAINEES IN MALAYSIA, supra note 23, at 21. 
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b. Malaysia’s inhuman treatment of Internal Security Act detainees 
violates customary international law and may constitute torture 
At a minimum, Malaysia treats ISA detainees inhumanely, and its 
actions may constitute torture when there is a coercive motive behind police 
actions.  Rule 90 prohibits “torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”78  
This provision mirrors Article 4, paragraph 2(a) of APII, which prohibits 
“violence to the life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any 
form of corporal punishment.”79  Aside from APII, several international 
conventions absolutely prohibit torture and underscore the illegality of 
Malaysia’s ISA practices.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,80 the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture,81 the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights,82 and the Geneva Conventions83 all prohibit 
torture, although they may rely on different definitions of torture.84 
The study defines torture as “the infliction of ‘severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering’ for purposes such as ‘obtaining information or a 
confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind.’”85  “Inhuman treatment” is similarly defined, 
absent the requirement of a purpose in its infliction.86  Unfortunately, these 
definitions fail to specify with great detail what qualifies as “severe physical 
or mental pain or suffering.”  Nonetheless, several studies have found 
detainee abuse patterns in Malaysia inconsistent with this generalized 
prohibition.   
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 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 315. 
79
 APII, supra note 7, art. 4. 
80
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5,U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
81
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984),(entered into force June 26, 1987). 
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 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”). 
83
 See Geneva Convention [I], supra note 14, art. 3, 12; Geneva Convention [III], supra note 14, art. 
13. 
84
 Amnesty International considers the absolute protection from torture to be “one of the 
fundamental rights from which no derogation is permitted, even in times of emergency or war,” especially 
given the fact that many conventions and treaties specifically prohibit torture “in times of emergency or 
war.”  Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58.    
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 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 317, citing Elements of Crimes for the ICC, 
Definition of Torture as a war crime (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(ii) and (c)(i)).  The commentary to APII 
similarly defines torture.  APII, supra note 7, art. 4(a); APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1373. 
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 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 318. 
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Though physical abuse of detainees appears to have abated since its 
widespread use during the 1960s and 1970s, the Royal Malaysian Police 
continue to threaten physical violence, beat prisoners during interrogation, 
and inflict extreme psychological abuse.87  Human Rights Watch found 
allegations of “physical and psychological torture, including allegations of 
physical assault, forced nudity, sleep deprivation, around-the-clock 
interrogation, death threats, threats of bodily harm to family members, 
including threats of rape and bodily harm to their children.”88  Additionally, 
Human Rights Watch has chronicled ISA detention camp police practices 
that were replete with excessive violence and deliberate acts of 
humiliation.89 
Similar to the study’s definition of torture, the study’s circular 
definition of “outrages upon personal dignity” fails to adequately specify 
prohibited conduct.  The ICRC study defines such outrages “as acts which 
humiliate, degrade, or otherwise violate the dignity of a person to such a 
degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity.”90  
Amnesty International (“AI”) found similar allegations of physical and 
psychological abuse that constitutes outrages upon personal dignity.91  
Despite the ICRC’s unclear definition of outrages upon personal dignity, 
Malaysian police actions included intentional humiliation. 
AI chronicles one individual, Abdul Malek Hussein, who claims “his 
mouth was forced open and he was forced to drink urine… his genitals were 
hit with a hard object, and . . . cold water was poured over him while naked 
in an air conditioned room.”92  Amnesty International also chronicles other 
ISA detainees’ allegations of physical abuse, sexual humiliation, and 
psychological harassment.93  In addition to the abuse of Mr. Hussein, AI 
found that Malaysia subjected ISA detainees to physical assault, solitary 
confinement, “prolonged aggressive interrogation,” and other actual and 
threatened physical and psychological abuse.94  These accounts constitute 
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 Fritz, supra note 23, at 1423-24. 
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 Human Rights Watch, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent, 
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humiliating outrages upon the dignity of the victims and violate Malaysia’s 
customary obligations. 
The illegal treatment of detainees is only one area in which Malaysian 
actions have violated customary IHL.  As discussed in the following section, 
the ISA and Malaysia’s enforcement practices also fail to safeguard 
detainees’ fundamental rights of criminal procedure. 
2. Malaysia’s Failure to Provide Adequate Judicial Guarantees for 
Internal Security Act Defendants Violates Its Customary Law 
Obligations 
Several aspects of the ISA also implicate the judicial guarantees of 
Article 6 of APII and many of the specific rules found to be customary IHL 
in the ICRC study.  Specifically, evidence indicates that ISA practices violate 
Rules 99, 100, 102, 103, and 128, all of which correlate to guarantees found 
in Article 6 of APII.95   
a. Internal Security Act detentions are arbitrary and lack judicial review 
Rule 99 prohibits the “arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”96  The ICRC 
study states that security concerns must be the basis for detention, and calls 
for continued detention upon a showing that such concerns are legitimate.97  
This rule elaborates on Article 6 of APII, which requires states to respect 
judicial guarantees of persons during “preliminary investigation and trial”.98   
The ICRC’s basis for this finding of customary practice rests on State 
legislation prohibiting practices ranging “from unlawful/illegal confinement 
and unlawful/illegal detention to arbitrary or unnecessary detention.”99  The 
study relies largely on customary human rights law, which “establishes (i) an 
obligation to inform a person who is arrested of the reasons for arrest, (ii) an 
obligation to bring a person arrested on a criminal charge promptly before a 
judge, and (iii) an obligation to provide a person deprived of liberty with an 
opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention.”100 
Similarly, Rule 102 prohibits conviction “except on the basis of 
individual criminal responsibility,”101 and Rule 103 implements this by 
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 APII, supra note 7, art. 6. 
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 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 344. 
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 Id. at 348. 
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 APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1396. 
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100
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prohibiting collective punishments.102  These provisions require that the 
accused only face punishment for acts in which he or she personally took 
part.103 
The ISA’s text contradicts these rules of customary international law 
by granting the police largely unchecked discretion in detaining persons.  
For example, Section 73 of the ISA permits the police to detain a person for 
60 days without a warrant, trial, or access to legal counsel on suspicion that 
“he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to 
the security of Malaysia.”104  Section 73 only requires police to have reason 
to believe a person has violated the ill-defined ISA,105 and Malaysian law 
enforcement practices include summary detentions for no reason other than 
the detainee’s political opposition.106   
Since the ISA permits preemptive, preventative detentions on 
suspicion that a person may be about to act in an undefined, prohibited 
manner, it essentially provides for arbitrary arrest by which “a detainee is, 
therefore, presumed guilty without trial.”107  One cabinet minister told 
Human Rights Watch that ISA detainees “have not committed any crime 
because ISA is preventive.  You cannot, therefore, go to court.  The 
government has information that something will happen.  We can’t wait till it 
happens. . . .  So before it happens we detain them.”108 
Malaysia’s 2001 persecution of the National Justice Party, an 
opposition political party, contradicts these rules.  In April 2001, the police 
arrested ten individuals associated with the National Justice Party, which is 
better known as Keadilan.  While the government alleged that those arrested 
sought to obtain bomb-making materials, their interrogations were devoid of 
any mention of violence and instead focused on their political activity, 
sources of funding, and even their extra-marital affairs.109  Especially since 
there may have been no probable cause to arrest these persons,110 the 
political nature of their interrogations indicates that the detentions were 
arbitrary. 
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Additionally, the ISA does not allow for judicial review of initial 
detentions.  It originally did permit such review, but amendments have 
removed that avenue such that “absolute power is given to the Minister of 
Home Affairs to arbitrarily detain anyone, without reference to the 
courts.”111  Two-year detentions have been indefinitely renewed without ever 
charging the detainee or bringing him to trial.112  The ISA’s grant of arbitrary 
and indefinite power to the government violates Malaysia’s customary IHL 
obligations and obliterates the targeted defendant’s rights from the outset of 
his or her detention. 
b. Malaysia has not provided fair trials to Internal Security Act 
detainees 
The ICRC study’s findings of criminal procedural guarantees also 
exceed APII’s protections, adding more detailed customary rules to the IHL 
regime.  Rule 100 states that “[n]o one may be convicted or sentenced, 
except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial guarantees.”113  
Drawing on the language of both the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols, this provision requires “that courts be independent,114 
impartial115 and regularly constituted;”116 questions the legality of 
suspending these requirements during states of emergency;117 and mandates 
the maintenance of the presumption of innocence.118  Similarly, Rule 128(C) 
requires that detainees in an internal armed conflict “be released as soon as 
the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist,” but permits 
                                         
111
 Human Rights Watch, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent, 
supra note 88.  See also Internal Security Act, Act 82, sec. 8(B) (“(1) There shall be no judicial review in 
any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision 
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 Amnesty International, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58. 
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 Id. at 355. 
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presumed to be not guilty... until proven otherwise.  This means that the burden of proof lies on the 
prosecution, while the defendant has the benefit of the doubt.  It also means that guilt must be proven 
according to a determined standard” (e.g. “beyond a reasonable doubt” (in common law countries)).  Id. at 
357 (footnotes omitted). 
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continued detention “if penal proceedings are pending against them or if 
they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed.”119 
Rule 100 also includes several procedural guarantees owed to an 
insurgent defendant.  The accused must be provided with “information on 
the nature and cause of the accusation” against him or her, receive 
“necessary rights and means of defense,” receive “trial without undue 
delay,” be able to examine witnesses against him or her, have the assistance 
of an interpreter if necessary, have the right to be present at trial, not be 
compelled to testify against him or herself or to confess guilt, not be 
subjected to public proceedings, and “not be punished more than once for 
the same act or on the same charge.”120  The ICRC bases these requirements 
on international law, military manuals, and state domestic law.121 
ISA-based detentions violate these rules because they lack effective 
means of judicial review of these detentions.  For example, the ISA permits 
the government to not “disclose facts or to produce documents which [it] 
considers to be against the national interest to disclose or produce.”122  This 
provision enables the government to withhold “the very facts that 
purportedly support the necessity of the individual’s arrest and detention,” 
and thus significantly limits the courts’ ability to review ISA detentions.123 
Following the initial sixty-day detention, the Minister of Home Affairs 
can indefinitely order two-year extensions to detention.124  These orders are 
not subject to judicial scrutiny and require no vetting or justification.125  The 
government has used this extension option,126 and it enables the government 
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to prolong detentions without judicial review and without having to provide 
a trial for the detainee. 
In fact, courts have also shown an unwillingness to intervene even in 
acknowledged unlawful detentions.  The Malaysian Federal Court, 
responding to the appeal of the Keadilan ISA detainees, found that their 
detentions were in fact unlawful, but declined to review detentions 
undertaken by authority of Section 8 of the ISA.127 
IV. THE ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY IMPACTS MULTINATIONAL 
COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS  
By identifying several rules contained within Additional Protocols I 
and II that are customary international law, the ICRC has issued a challenge 
to the world to address the deficient practices of non-party states.  While this 
comment identifies the domestic practices of one state in conflict with 
customary international law, the study has broader ramifications for all states 
seeking security assistance during conflicts, both internal and international.  
These states will face the criticism of potential military coalition partners 
who heed the study’s findings and demand compliance as a condition of 
participation.  This conflict has two effects: while it could obstruct the 
efforts of troubled states to obtain unqualified security assistance, it also 
could lead to legal reform in noncompliant states as they change their ways 
in order to form partnerships with foreign militaries.   
A. The Conflict Between Malaysia’s Obligations and Practices Illustrates 
the Ramifications of the Red Cross Study on Multinational Operations 
in Failing States 
The incongruence of state laws and the study’s customary IHL 
obligations may impact multinational coalition military operations in states 
fighting insurgencies, especially insurgencies of a transnational, terrorism-
based nature.  First, states not parties to APII face the articulated position of 
the well-respected ICRC and emerging international consensus in choosing 
whether to conform their counter-insurgency behavior and laws to its 
customary law findings.128  Second, while non-party states may or may not 
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choose to reform their laws and practices, foreign forces adhering to the 
ICRC’s findings will likely limit their cooperation in joint military 
operations with these non-party states in order to meet their perceived 
international law obligations.129  In light of the illegality of Malaysia’s ISA 
practices with respect to the ICRC’s customary international law findings, 
and the possibility that the United States would offer its assistance to combat 
a terrorism-focused insurgency in Malaysia,130 it is useful to consider the 
effects of the study, and Malaysia’s behavior, on U.S. forces operating in 
Malaysia in the future. 
1. There Remains a Present Threat of Terrorism-Focused Insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia 
Analyzing the ICRC study’s ramifications in the context of a 
Southeast Asian conflict is relevant at this time because of the likelihood of 
future and increasing terrorist threats originating in the region.  As one of the 
world’s most heavily Muslim regions,131 and given the abundance of militant 
Islamic activities in the region since 2001,132 it is likely that future 
insurgencies will arise and will call for the application and enforcement of 
IHL.   
The Jemaah Islamiyah (“JI”) terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda and 
the Abu Sayyaf Group, presents a new type of militant Islamic threat with 
supra-national ideology and goals.133  While the regional governments have 
made significant progress in combating and weakening JI,134 the same 
confluence of factors that led to its ascension continue to exist.   
Some scholars consider the international diffusion of trained radicals 
following the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s to be very 
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instructive in predicting future militant Islamic activities today.135  Notorious 
examples of veterans of that war include Osama Bin Laden; several of the 
participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; JI’s mastermind, 
Hambali; and Ali Gufron, a planner of the 2002 Bali bombing.136  These 
examples may be predictive of future militant Islamic activity worldwide, 
especially in populous Muslim regions such as Southeast Asia.  
2. The Study Has Implications Both for a Malaysian Conflict and for 
Multinational Operations Worldwide 
In the context of a Malaysian internal armed conflict, possible 
coalition partners might limit or qualify their participation in military 
operations in Malaysia due to its objectionable ISA practices.  The United 
States, a likely partner given its global focus on combating terrorism, 
provides an example in evaluating the potential impact of the ICRC study.  
U.S. domestic and international law obligations could lead to limited support 
for coalition operations in Malaysia. 
It is possible Malaysia could seek international assistance in fighting 
transnational terrorists within its borders in the future.  Since 2001, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) member states have 
increasingly cooperated in efforts to combat terrorism.137  This multinational 
focus is the result of international recognition that a transnational terrorist 
organization introduces a need for international counterterrorism prevention 
and operations.138  In the future, the region’s response to Islamic terror is 
very likely to continue to be multinational given the 2001 and 2002 ASEAN 
anti-terror pacts calling for mutual assistance, intelligence-sharing, and 
cooperation, and given recent multinational operations against those 
responsible for the Bali bombings.139 
U.S. military policies indicate that the ICRC study will impact the 
U.S. military’s conduct in an internal conduct.  While conducting operations 
in a foreign “host nation,” the host nation’s laws limit the actions of U.S. 
military personnel.  Specifically, U.S. military policies require forces to 
                                         
135
 Following the Soviet-Afghani war, hundreds of fighters from the U.S.-backed Mujahideen 
returned to their home states and formed threatening terrorism organizations.  Peter Bergen & Alec 
Reynolds, Blowback Revisited, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 2-3.    
136
 Bergen, supra note 135, at 2-4. 
137
 Gregory Rose & Diana Nestorovska, Towards an ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Treaty, 9 Sing. Year 
Book Int’l L. 157, 185 (2005).    
138
 See SINGH, supra note 1, at 57.  See also id. at 188 (2005) (“Due to the transnational nature of 
much terrorist activity in the ASEAN region, prevention cooperation and mutual assistance in enforcement 
measures at the international level are essential.”). 
139
 SINGH, supra note 1, at 58-59; see also Emmanuel, supra note 1. 
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observe the host nation’s law unless it violates international law.140  Where 
the host nation’s law does not meet the U.S. forces’ obligations under U.S. 
domestic law or international law recognized by the U.S., the U.S. military 
will limit its conduct to that which the U.S. considers legal.141  These 
policies “encompass[] all international law for the conduct of hostilities 
binding on the United States . . . including treaties and international 
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary 
international law.”142   
While members of the Administration of U.S. President George W. 
Bush have argued that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to conflicts 
with terrorist forces, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the applicability 
of IHL, including the Geneva Conventions, to these conflicts.  In 2002, U.S. 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez wrote that the “war against terrorism . . . 
renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy 
prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.”143  In 2006, the U.S. 
Supreme Court repudiated this argument, holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that the military commission established to try Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden’s 
alleged driver, was illegal in part because it ran afoul of Common Article 
Three’s requirements for basic judicial guarantees.144  The U.S. Congress, in 
establishing rules for Courts Martial, conditioned the authority to establish 
military commissions to try combatants on “compliance with the law of 
war,” e.g. the Geneva Conventions.145  Granted, Justice John Paul Stevens’s 
opinion does not carry a majority when he states that customary international 
law informs the minimum guarantees required under Common Article 
Three.146  However, the Hamdan decision affirms the authority of IHL as a 
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source of law and requires U.S. conduct to be in compliance with IHL so 
long as the U.S. Congress invokes IHL in regulating military conduct.147 
Given the ICRC’s position that several APII provisions are customary 
international law, the study’s findings provide additional detail to the 
undefined terminology of APII against which military lawyers will compare 
proposed military operations.  The United States military, as a matter of 
policy, already considers almost all of APII to be customary international 
law.148  The United States Army also already considers the detainee 
protections of APII to be a “minimum standard” for all internal conflicts,149 
with which it will comply whenever feasible given military operational 
requirements.150  It is the ICRC’s elaboration on the rules of APII, and the 
findings of customary rules exceeding APII’s protections, that will enhance 
the regulation of internal armed conflict, and consequently the U.S. 
military’s conduct.   
Barring a change in U.S. policy, military judge advocates may advise 
commanders to act within the limits of the ICRC study, which could impact 
coalition operations intended to facilitate ISA detentions.  The U.S. 
Department of Defense places judge advocate legal advisors at every level of 
the military command structure to advise military commanders on how to 
comply with IHL obligations before, during, and after military operations.151  
Additionally, judge advocates must review all operations, plans, rules of 
engagement, and orders for compliance with IHL.152  The events of Abu 
Ghraib, the controversy surrounding Guantanamo Bay, and other 
controversial U.S. military detentions raised questions about the legality of 
U.S. forces’ conduct under international law.  At the time, senior military and 
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civilian attorneys in the U.S. military perceived and raised these 
questions.153  The ICRC study may provide strength for civilian counsels and 
military judge advocate attorneys to argue that international law prohibits 
the full participation of U.S. forces in a given counterinsurgency 
operation.154  Limitations could include a prohibition on participation in 
ISA-related operations, or even advising against participating in any 
operations in Malaysia absent reform in the country’s practices.   
The conflicts between Malaysia’s obligations under the ICRC’s 
customary law study and its ISA detention practices could make it difficult 
for Malaysia to obtain unqualified support from other states’ armies.  The 
limitations on United States military operations could be shared by all 
coalition forces objecting to the ISA and Malaysian law enforcement 
practices.  Should Malaysia seek to obtain coalition support for a future 
conflict, many of the same objections human rights organizations raise to the 
ISA detentions would arise in the context of an internal armed conflict 
subject to APII.   
This problem is universally applicable to other conflicts in other states 
not party to APII.  Many of these states may find themselves seeking 
international military assistance to combat future internal threats.  Since 
states seeking international assistance are often failed or failing states,155 
many of them not parties to APII, the ICRC may have made it more difficult 
for these countries to garner international support when needed. 
B. The Red Cross Study Has Broader Ramifications for the Advancement 
of International Humanitarian Law 
While the ICRC study may have directly limited some states’ access 
to unqualified military support, it may also indirectly increase international 
pressure for legal reform in these states.  As discussed, the study has raised 
the bar for all states to meet IHL obligations.  As preeminent states such as 
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the U.S. embrace the study, the ICRC will find available in multinational 
military cooperation a new avenue to realize legal reform in non-party states.    
The study’s findings introduce an avenue by which states observing 
customary law may bring pressure to bear on noncompliant states.  When a 
foreign military prepares for or conducts operations with a non-party state, 
the ICRC study will provide additional justification upon which a foreign 
commander can refuse to cooperate in an illegal action.  Additionally, that 
commander will have legal justification to seek to bring the non-party state’s 
conduct into line with customary international law.   
The study thus counterbalances its burdensome effect on non-party 
states by opening up a new avenue for international pressure to change the 
behavior of noncompliant states: military cooperation.156  For example, the 
United States conducts multinational military training programs to further 
national security goals while subtly working to bring about change in foreign 
military or law enforcement practices.  Notable examples of this avenue for 
reform include the Philippines and Colombia, where the United States 
military has for many years offered training assistance to national forces.157  
This training is replete with military skills instruction, but it also includes 
significant amounts of human rights and IHL instruction at all levels of 
command, from the foot soldier to the general.158  It is through military 
security assistance such as coalition operations and these long-term training 
missions that the international community can emphasize the importance of 
adhering to customary rules of international law.  The examples of Colombia 
and the Philippines are ripe for repetition in several potentially violent states 
not parties to APII, such as Malaysia. 
The complexities of applying APII as customary law to a non-party 
state’s internal conflict not only make the ICRC’s case for acceptance of 
APII a more difficult argument, but they also provide an opportunity for the 
international community to join the ICRC in calling for widespread 
acceptance of increased regulation of internal armed conflicts.  This 
worldwide acceptance of an enhanced customary IHL regime could lead to 
reforms in non-party states and considerably strengthen the humanitarian 
protections afforded both civilians and combatants in internal armed 
conflicts.   
                                         
156
 See KAPLAN, supra note 130, at 61-62 (“Still, third world military men were more likely to listen 
to American officers who briefed them about human rights as a tool of counterinsurgency than to civilians 
who talked abstractly about universal principles of justice.”). 
157
 See generally id. (describing U.S. Special Forces operations training and assisting militaries in 
several countries’ counter-insurgencies). 
158
 See id. at 56-57, 61-62. 




Since the ICRC study may have a significant impact on states not 
party to Additional Protocol II, the ICRC has issued a challenge to the world 
to more strictly regulate internal armed conflict.  While the study may have 
made it more difficult for a troubled state to obtain full-fledged coalition 
support from other countries, it also may have strengthened the ICRC’s hand 
in realizing universal acceptance of the international regulation of internal 
armed conflicts because of its effects on individual states who currently 
object to the regulation of their internal conflicts. 
While Malaysia provides a sound test case to consider the study’s 
ramifications, the conflicts between the ICRC study’s findings and the ISA 
practices are instructive of the possible effects of the study worldwide.  
Other countries with similar, questionably-legal practices may find 
themselves answering to a chorus of both military and political objections 
should they seek assistance in their future conflicts.   
Finally, an underlying purpose of the ICRC in promulgating rules of 
customary IHL may be to preempt the further erosion of the IHL regime in 
the face of the post-September 11th world response to terrorism.  It is the 
new global terrorism battlefield, in which states appeal to national security 
and emergency situations as bases to abrogate people’s rights, that both 
makes IHL vulnerable and makes customary law important.159  While states 
such as the United States have shown willingness to issue and apply 
controversial interpretations of applicable IHL in the face of terrorism,160 
customary law continues to inform baseline requirements for situations to 
which conventions and treaties may not apply.  By issuing its customary law 
study and encouraging dialogue within each state as well as internationally, 
the ICRC has preemptively strengthened the IHL regime in the face of some 
states’ willingness to exhibit flexibility and push the boundaries of what is 
legal in such unclear situations.   
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